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SEGREGATION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE DECLINE
OF PLESSY V. FERGUSON

Paul G. Kauper*
N the landmark case of Plessy v. Ferguson/ decided in 1896, the
Supreme Court of the United States gave its sanction to the "separate but equal" doctrine in the interpretation of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. More particularly, the Court
held that a state statute requiring racial segregation in railway service
did not result in a denial of the equal protection of the laws. This
decision did not go unchallenged. Kentucky-born Justice John Harlan
remonstrated in a dissenting opinion of extraordinary force. 2 Crying
out like a lone voice in the wilderness he predicted that the judgment
declared that day would "prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case."3 Justice Harlan
did not live to see the vindication of his dissenting opinion. The
Fourteenth Amendment became firmly encrusted with the separatebut-equal interpretation adopted in the Plessy case. Countenanced by
this interpretation, legally coerced segregation became a common pattern of life in a substantial segment of the American community.
But the vitality of Justice Harlan's dissent was not impaired by
the long period of dormancy. The rise of the Negro to a position of
new importance in American life and his demand for enjoyment of
the equality designed to be secured for him by the amendments adopted
in the wake of the Civil War created a new milieu that would inevitably require reexamination of the basic premises underlying the
Plessy case. The period beginning with World War II proved to be
decisive in improvement of the Negro's constitutional position. In
1944 he won a signal victory in the struggle to assert his right to
vote in the Democratic primary and thereby obtain effective enjoyment of the voting privilege guaranteed to him by the Fifteenth Amendment. 4 Then began the more intensive attack on coerced segregation.
Judicially enforced segregation in the use and enjoyment of land was
declared invalid in Shelley v. Kraemer. 5 But it was in the field of
public education that the first frontal assault was directed upon the

I

,. Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).
2 See Watt and Orlikoff, "The Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan," 44 ILL.
L. REv. 13 (1949).
s 163 U.S. 537 at 559, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).
4 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757 (1944).
5 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948).
.
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basic doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson. In the Sweatt6 and McLaurin7
cases, decided in 1950, both involving racial segregation at state universities, the Court was asked to overrule the separate-but-equal doctrine. It was able to avoid the issue in these two cases by finding
that the Negro students here involved suffered unlawful discrimination within the framework of the segregation pattern established by
the state since they did not in fact enjoy equality in the educational
opportunities offered by the state.
The necessity of corning to grips with Plessy v. Ferguson was
finally forced on the Court in the series of cases dealing with segregation in public education at the lower levels. In cases arising in Kansas,
South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware and the District of Columbia, all
consolidated for hearing before the Supreme Court,8 the validity of
racial segregation in public education at the elementary and high school
levels was the central issue. The first four cases turned on the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the case arising
in the District of Columbia turned on the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. These cases were heard and decided on the assumption that the separate educational facilities furnished Negro students were either equal to those furnished white students or were
in the process of being equalized. The importance of the cases W8$
attested by the extended period taken by the Court in arriving at its
decision. First argued in the 1952 term, the cases were put over
and re-argued in the 1953 term with respect to a series of questions
propounded by the Court.9
6 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 848 (1950).
7 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education,

339 U.S. 637, 70
S.Ct. 851 (1950).
8 For the history of each of these cases and the citations to the decisions of the lower
courts in these cases, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954),
footnote I.
9 The questions propounded by the Court were as follows:
"I. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted. and the State legis•
latures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated or did not
contemplate, understood or did not understand, that it would abolish segregation in public
schools?
"2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment understood that compliance with it would require the immediate abolition of
segregation in public schools, was it nevertheless the understanding of the framers of the
Amendment
"(a) that future Congresses might, in the exercise of their power under section 5 of
the Amendment, abolish such segregation, or
"(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future conditions, to
construe the Amendment as abolishing such segregation of its own force?
"3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 2(a) and (b) do not dispose
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In its historic decision of May 17, 1954,1° the Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Warren who delivered a relatively short opinion
on behalf of a unanimous Court, dealt a damaging blow to the separatebut-equal doctrine. It held in this series of cases, sub nom. Brown 11.
Board of Education,11 that racial segregation in public schools maintained by the states deprived the children of the minority group of
equal educational opportunities and hence denied to them the equal
protection of the laws as required by the Fourteenth Amendment. A
similar result was reached under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the case originating in the District of Columbia.12
The repudiation of the Plessy doctrine in its application to public
schools warrants examination of the considerations that led the Court
to sanction racial segregation in 1896 when Plessy 11. Ferguson was
decided. In this case, which involved a Louisiana statute requiring
racial segregation in railway transportation, the arguments were made
that this legislation was designed to impose an inferior status on the
Negro race and for this reason was invalid both as a form of involuntary servitude forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment and as a denial
of equal protection of the laws secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment argument was readily disposed
of the issue, is it within the judicial power, in construing the Amendment, to abolish segregation in public schools?
"4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth
Amendment
"Ca) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by normal
geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of
their choice, or
"Cb) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual
adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based on
color distinctions?
"5. On the assumption on which questions 4Ca) and (b) are based, and assuming
further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 4(b)
"Ca) should this court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;
"(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;
"Cc) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to
recommending specific terms for such decrees;
"(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to frame
decrees in these cases, and if so what general directions should the decrees of this Court
include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at the
specific terms of more detailed decrees?" Brown v. Board of Education, 345 U.S. 972, 73
S.Ct. 1114 (1953).
10 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Briggs v. Elliott, Davis v. County School
Board of Prince Edward County, Gebhart v. Belton, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954).
This series of cases will hereinafter be referred to as Brown v. Board of Education.
11 See note 10 supra.
12 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693 (1954).
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of in the majority opinion by Justice Brown on the ground that a
statute making a distinction between white and colored races did not
create that state of bondage implicit in the idea of involuntary servitude.13
The Fourteenth Amendment argument was seen to be the chief
argument and it received extended treatment in the majority opinion.
While recognizing that the object of the Fourteenth Amendment was
undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before
the law, the Court stated that "in the nature of things it could not
have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to
enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either."14 The
Court rejected the argument that segregation laws implied the inferiority of either race to the other or that it stamped the colored race
with a badge of inferiority. Moreover, the Court pointed out that
segregation had been accepted by other courts as a proper exercise of
the police power. It pointed to Roberts 11. City of Boston,1 5 decided
in 1849 by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, upholding
the separation of the races in the public schools, to state court decisions upholding legislation requiring segregation of the races by
common carriers, and to a state court decision upholding an antimiscegenation statute.
Answering the argument that if a state could classify on the basis
of color with respect to the use of common carrier facilities there
would be no limit to the legislative power to classify, no matter how
absurd, the Court in the Plessy case stated that every exercise of the
police power must be reasonable and extend only to such laws as
are enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good and
not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class. As the
Court saw it, the case then reduced itself to the question whether
the Louisiana statute was a reasonable regulation. On the question
whether a regulation was reasonable the Court noted that a large discretion must be accorded the legislature which is at liberty to act
with reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of
the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and
the preservation of the public peace and good order.16 Guided by
13Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 542-543, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).
14 Id. at 544.
15 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 (1849).
16 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 550, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).
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these considerations the Court held that the Louisiana segregation
statute could not be considered unreasonable.
In his forthright dissent:1 7 Justice Harlan stated that in his opinion
the matter of race was irrelevant where the civil rights of citizens
were concerned. He pointed to the amendments of the reconstruction period as removing the race line from our governmental systems.
Referring to the Slaughterhouse Cases1 8 and to Strauder v. West
Virginia,1 9 he declared that these cases had made clear that the paramount purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to protect the
Negro race against discrimination. Meeting the argument that the
Louisiana statute did not discriminate against either race, but prescribed a rule applicable alike to white and colored citizens, Justice
Harlan stated that the purpose of the statute was to exclude colored
people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons and
that no one could be so wanting in candor as to assert the contrary.
The fundamental objection therefore to the statute was that it interfered with the personal freedom of citizens on the basis of race. It
was no answer to say that this was a reasonable exercise of the police
power. Courts were not to judge the policy or expediency of legislation. The question was one of power to pass the statute. Stating
that our Constitution is color-blind and that it neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens, Justice Harlan denied that it was
within the power of a state to regulate enjoyment of civil rights on
the basis of race. Characterizing the Louisiana segregation statute as
one that imposed the brand of servitude and degradation upon a
large class of fellow citizens and stating that this "thin disguise of
'equal' accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead any one,"20 he expressed his opinion that state enactments of
this kind, "cunningly devised to defeat legitimate results of the war
. . . can have no other result than to render permanent peace impossible, and to keep alive a conllict of races. . . ."21 He attached
no importance to the decisions by state courts, cited by the majority,
upholding racial segregation laws, since some had been decided prior
to adoption of the amendments that followed the war and others had
been decided by courts in states dominated by the institution of slavery
11 Id.,

beginning at 552.

1s 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1873).
19

100 U.S. 303 (1879).
163 U.S. 537 at 562, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).

20 Plessy v. Ferguson,
2 1 Id. at 560-561.
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and when "race prejudice was, practically, the supreme law of the
land."22
Briefly stated, then, the majority opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson
held that legislation requiring racial segregation in the enjoyment of
common carrier service could be justified as a reasonable exercise of
the police power which did not impair the equality of rights as between the two races. Justice Harlan contended that a segregation
law of this kind was designed to create an inferior status for the Negro
and therefore deprived him of the equality of right secured by the
Constitution.
The Plessy _decision obviously gave no carte blanche endorsement
to all segregation legislation. Any such legislation must meet the test
of reasonableness as an exercise of the police power. Moreover, within
the framework of the segregation pattern established by a state it was
necessary that the two races stand on a footing of equality in the
enjoyment of privileges and facilities. Whether there was equality
in fact was open to judicial scrutiny.
That racial segregation in the enjoyment of common carrier services was a reasonable exercise of the police power was established by
the Plessy case itself. Insofar as intrastate transportation was concerned, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
furnished the only basis for attack on such practices, and in view of
Plessy v. Ferguson the only question open for consideration was
whether the two races enjoyed equal accommodations. Proceeding on
this premise, the Court in the McCabe case23 held invalid so much of
a state statute which permitted carriers to provide certain £.rst-class
traveling facilities to white persons while denying them to Negroes.
The problem became more complicated with respect to interstate
transportation. The Interstate Commerce Act forbids discriminatory
practices by carriers in interstate transportation. 24 The federal statute
does ·not in terms forbid segregation practices by carriers, and for this
reason segregation practices by carriers, whether or not required by
state statute, have been held invalid only if they resulted in discrimination in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act or if, apart from
the Interstate Commerce Act, they placed Negro passeD;gers at a substantial disadvantage in the enjoyment of interstate travel facilities and
thereby interfered with the freedom of interstate travel impliedly se22 Id. at 563.
v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 35 S.Ct. 69 (1914).
2449 u.s.c. (1946) §3(1).

23 McCabe
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cured by the commerce clause.25 The recent cases arising under the Interstate Commerce Act indicate a close scrutiny by the Supreme Court
to see whether carriers in their segregation practices have in fact denied
equality of service and thereby discriminated against Negro passengers.
Thus the Court found violations of the Interstate Commerce Act in
cases where the carrier denied to Negroes the same first class accommodations it furnished white passengers26 and where racial segregation in dining cars resulted in poorer service for Negroes than for
whites. 27 Moreover, in Morgan v. Virginia2 8 the Court found that
the enforcement of a state segregation statute which had the effect
of forcing a Negro to change bus seats while in the course of an
interstate journey constituted an unlawful burden upon interstate commerce. Indeed, the opinion in this case indicated that the states were
powerless to prescribe rules respecting segregation as they related to
interstate transportation since this was a matter requiring a uniform
national policy.29
In summary, the application of the Plessy doctrine in regard to
transportation service has been held in check by careful adherence to
the requirement that the facilities furnished the two races be equal
and by the further limitations imposed by the commerce clause and
the Interstate Commerce Act in regard to interstate transportation.
In the earlier discussion of the Plessy opinion emphasis was placed
on the limitation derived from the Court's statement that segregation
legislation could be maintained in the face of the equal protection
clause only if it represented a reasonable exercise of the police power.
The cases dealing with racial segregation in the enjoyment of residential property may be viewed as an illustration of this limitation.
A municipal ordinance which established separate residential districts
for Negroes and whites was held invalid in Buchanan v. Warley30
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an
2:; Chiles v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 71, 30 S.Ct. 667 (1910), held that state
segregation legislation was not invalid per se in its application to interstate railway transportation.
2s Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 61 S.Ct. 873 (1941).
21 Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816, 70 S.Ct. 843 (1950).
2s 328 U.S. 373, 66 S.Ct. 1050 (1946).
29 See also Chance v. Lambeth, (4th Cir. 1951) 186 F. (2d) 879, cert. den. sub
nom. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Chance, 341 U.S. 941, 71 S.Ct. 1001 (1951), second
appeal denied, 198 F. (2d) 549 (1952), cert. den. 344 U.S. 877, 73 S.Ct. 172 (1952),
holding that the railroad's practice of requiring segregation in its cars was invalid under
the commerce clause since the effect of the practice in the instant case was to compel a
change of cars in the course of an interstate journey.
so 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16 (1917).
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arbitrary interference with property rights. The effect of the ordinance in this case was to prevent a white owner from selling his property to a Negro. The fact that the party challenging the ordinance
was a white person probably accounted for the use of the due process clause in invalidating the ordinance rather than the equal protection clause. In any event this decision made clear that the Court
was not disposed to apply the Plessy doctrine so far as the acquisition
and enjoyment of residential real estate were concerned.31 The argument was made that the segregation ordinance ~hould be held valid
as an exercise of the police power in order to promote the public peace
by preventing race riots. The Court answered that the aim of preserving public peace, desirable and important as it was, could not be
accomplished at the expense of rights protected by the Constitution.
Any doubt that might have remained as to the validity of racial
segregation in the enjoyment of residential property was dispelled by
Shelley v. Kraemer 2 which held that enforcement by a state court of
a restrictive covenant precluding use of residential property by Negroes
was state action that amounted to a denial of the equal protection of
the laws. The opinion in this case was notable not only because it
equated judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants with residential
segregation ordinances for the purpose of determining whether there
was "state action," but also because the Court in finding that enforcement of these covenants resulted in unconstitutional discrimination
against Negroes advanced arguments that were basically incompatible
with the reasoning of Plessy v. Ferguson. The opinion pointed out
that petitioners were being denied property rights accorded to others
of different race or color. Nor was it any answer to say that the
courts would also enforce restrictive covenants against whites and
thereby preserve equality between the races. The petitioners had a
personal right to equal protection and their personal right was not
achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities. The
opinion in this case, including the closing paragraph with its statement that a prime concern in the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was to remove discrimination based on race or color, suggests
a Havor reminiscent of Justice Harlan's dissent in the Plessy case.
s1 In City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704, 50 S.Ct. 407 (1930), the Court by
per curiam decision, citing Buchanan v. Warley, affirmed a decree granting equitable
relief to a Negro against enforcement of a municipal ordinance which had the effect of
barring the Negro from the occupancy of certain property.
s2 334 U.S. I, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948).
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The question may be raised why the residential segregation of
races is in itself invalid as compared with racial segregation in the use
of common carrier facilities. The opinions in the cases cited furnish
no clear answer to this question. The writer suggested earlier that
these cases illustrate the limitation derived from the Plessy case that
segregation legislation is valid only if it is a reasonable exercise of
the police power. But what makes residential segregation legislation
unreasonable as compared with legislation requiring segregation by
common carriers? Perhaps the answer is to be found in the greater
emphasis upon property rights so far as constitutional protection is
concerned. Perhaps it is found in the equity doctrine which permits
specific performance of contracts to purchase real estate on the ground
that each parcel of real estate is unique in character, hence the
separate-but-equal idea has no relevancy. A more substantial consideration, however, appears to be that the freezing of residential districts on a racial basis has the inevitable effect of forcing all Negroes
to live in inferior residential areas. 33 To speak of separate-but-equal
facilities in this situation is to ignore the testimony of experience.
Perhaps the conclusion to be drawn from these cases was that the
Plessy doctrine was inapplicable in areas of right and privilege where
racial segregation and equal enjoyment were inherently incompatible.
We turn then to the problem of racial segregation in public education. As was pointed out by the Court in Plessy '17. Ferguson, segregation of the races in public schools was an established practice at the
time that case was decided. It pointed specifically to this practice in
the District of Columbia schools, mentioned racial segregation in
public education in some of the Northern States both before and after
the Civil War and referred to decisions of state courts sustaining this
practice. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court in
Gong Lum v. Rice,34 decided in 1927, upheld racial segregation in
a public school system on the authority of Plessy '17. Ferguson and other
earlier state court decisions dealing with this same question. 35
The cases that thereafter came before the Court in regard to
segregation in education turned on the question of equality of treatSee Martin, "Segregation of Residences of Negroes," 32 M:rcH. L. REv. 721 (1934).
275 U.S. 78, 48 S.Ct. 91 (1927).
35 See also the earlier decision in Cumming v. County Board of Education, 175 U.S.
528, 20 S.Ct. 197 (1899), where the Court denied relief to Negro taxpayers who sought
an injunction requiring the defendant school board to discontinue the operation of a high
school for white children until such time as the board resumed operation of a high school
for Negro children.
33

34
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ment within the pattern of segregation. The treatment of the equality
problem in these cases manifested an increasing responsiveness by the
Court to the Negro's claim that the system of segregation in the state's
educational system operated to discriminate against him. Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada36 held that the State of Missouri which furnished
a law school for white students at its university did not discharge its
obligation to furnish equal treatment for Negro law students by offering to pay their tuition at an out-of-state school open to them. Equal
protection meant equal protection within the state's own borders.
Then came Sipuel v. Board of Regents31 finding a denial of equal
protection by Oklahoma because of its refusal to admit Negro students
to the state law school when no separate law school was maintained
for Negroes.
The Sipuel case made it evident that the question of the continued
vitality of the separate-but-equal idea in its application to public education was now reaching a critical stage. Two decisions handed down
in 1950 assumed extraordinary importance. In Sweatt v. Painter2 8
where a Negro claimed the right to enter the University of Texas Law
School even though a separate law school had been established for
Negroes, the Court was asked to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson in its
application to public education. But as pointed out earlier in this
article the Court avoided this question while at the same time giving
relief to the petitioner by finding that the separate law school for
Negroes did not in fact give Negroes the benefits enjoyed by students at the university law school. What was significant was the
Court's close scrutiny of the facts relevant to the question of equality.
In terms of the reputation and prestige of the university law school,
the position and influence of the alumni, the opportunity for interplay of ideas, exchange of views and association with students who
would eventually constitute the larger part of the legal profession with
whom the petitioner would be dealing, the legal education offered the
petitioner at the separate school for Negroes was found to be inferior
to that offered to students of other races.
The companion case of McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents39
was perhaps even more significant. The petitioner, a Negro, had been
admitted to graduate study at the University, but in keeping with the
state's segregation statute, the university authorities had imposed upon
305
332
38 339
39 339
36

37

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

337,
631,
629,
637,

59 S.Ct. 232
68 S.Ct. 299
70 S.Ct. 848
70 S.Ct. 851

(1938).
(1948).
(1950).
(1950).
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him a number of restrictions designed to set him apart from other
students in the classrooms, reading room and cafeteria. The imposition of these restrictions was held to result in discriminatory treatment and hence a denial of equal protection of the laws. The Court
found that these restrictions hampered the petitioner in his pursuit of
effective graduate instruction since they impaired and inhibited his
ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with
other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.
Although the Court carefully avoided a reconsideration of Plessy v.
Ferguson and the separate-but-equal doctrine derived from it, it is
clear that these two cases sounded the death knell for legally imposed
racial segregation in the field of higher education under state auspices.
It was most unlikely that the separate law school for Negroes in Texas
would ever afford its students the intangible experience and benefits
stressed by the Court in the Sweatt case. Moreover, the emphasis in
the McLaurin case on the petitioner's right to receive the full benefit
of the graduate instruction program by discussing problems and exchanging views with other students undermined the very basic objective of segregation practices. While giving lip service to Plessy v.
Ferguson and purporting to act within the confines of the separate-butequal doctrine, the Court had effectively devitalized the doctrine in at
least one area of public education.40
The stage was thus set for the recent series of cases involving
racial segregation in public education at the elementary and high school
levels. The question whether the separate-but-equal idea could have
any further validity in public school systems maintained by the states
was forced on the Court since it was conceded that facilities were
either equal or were in the process of equalization. The scope of the
arguments before the Court both at the time of the original hearing
and on re-argument with respect to specific questions propounded by
the Court41 indicated a judicial receptiveness to complete re-examination of the Plessy doctrine in its relevancy to public education, with
reference both to historical factors and the impact 9f segregation on
the educational process in contemporary society.
The result of the Court's decision announced May 17, 1954,42
was the complete demolition of the Plessy doctrine in its application
to public schools. 'We conclude that in the field of public education
40 See Ransmeier, "The Fourteenth Amendment and the 'Separate but Equal' Doctrine," 50 MICH. L. REv. 203 at 238-241 (1951).
41 See the text of these questions in note 9 supra.
42 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954).
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the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
Chief Justice Warren's 9pinion gave attention at the outset to the
question of "historical intent." This question had been examined in
the re-argument of the cases since the questions propounded by the
Court for hearing on re-argument included the questions (1) whether
Congress and the states at the time of submission and rati:6.cation of
the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated that its effect would be to
abolish segregation in education, and (2) whether the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment understood (a) that future Congresses might
in exercise of their power under the :fifth section of the Fourteenth
Amendment abolish such segregation or (b) that it would be within
the judicial power, in light of future conditions, to construe the Amendment as abolishing such segregation of its own force. 43
The relevancy of these questions was apparent since one of the
strongest arguments made by the proponents of segregation in public
schools was that such segregation was common at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted and hence there could have been no
intention to interfere with this practice, especially since such practices
were followed in some northern as well as southern states.
Briefs presented to the Court in response to its inquiry as to
historical intent gave the Court the bene:6.t of extended historical research. Attention is called particularly to the discussion of these
problems in the Supplemental Brief for the United States on Reargument44 and the accompanying Appendix dealing entirely with
source materials relevant to the determination of historical intent.45
What did these historical materials prove? The Court's opinion
disposes of them quite summarily by stating that although these sources
cast some light, it was not enough to resolve the problem before the
Court. 46 In short, the appeal to history was inconclusive. It was in43 See note 9 supra.
44 The Attorney General
curiae.

of the United States participated in these cases as arnicus

45 See, for instance, the treatment in the Appendix, at pp. 139-160, of the materials
dealing with the Civil Rights Act of 1875. An important issue in the course of the debates
on this legislation was whether Congress should prohibit segregation in public schools or
whether it should explicitly recognize the "separate but equal" doctrine in respec~ to schools.
In order to secure passage of a civil rights bill, the opposing groups compromised on the
school issue by striking out from the bill all references to schools. For the interpretation of
these debates as they were pertinent to the matter of historical intent, see Supplemental
Brief for the United States on Reargument, pp. 78-86.
46 "Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices in racial segregation, and
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conclusive both because the understanding of the Congress, the states,
and the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment could not be authoritatively determined,47 and because the status of public education at
the time of adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment furnished little
occasion for considering the Amendment's impact on segregation in
education. In the South education of white children was almost
wholly in the hands of private groups and education of Negroes was
almost non-existent.
The question was, therefore, not prejudged by history. The fact
that racial segregation in public education was in effect in some states
did not necessarily establish that the Fourteenth Amendment served
to legitimize such a practice.
As the Court saw it, then, the question before it was not what was
the understanding in regard to this problem in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, or even in 1896 when Plessy 11.
Ferguson was written. 'We must consider public education in the
light of its full development and its present place in American life
throughout the nation. Only in tnis way can it be determined if
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws."
·
the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own
investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to
resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most
avid proponents ·of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all
legal distinctions among 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States.' Their
opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendment and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the
state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty." Chief
Justice Warren in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 at 489, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954).
47 The Court's summary treatment of the historical materials is of interest apart from
its significance in the case before the Court. Much research and writing have been devoted
in recent years to the history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Was it intended to make
the Bill of Rights applicable to the states by means of the privileges and immunities clause
of the amendment's first section'? Was the amendment intended to serve as a medium for
the protection of fundamental rights, both substantive and procedural, through application
of the due process clause'? Was it intended to secure protection for corporations as well
as natural persons'? See, for instance, Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947), and cf. Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights'? The Original Understanding," 2 STANFORD
L. REv. 5 (1949). The opinion in the principal case bears witness to the hazards involved
in attempting to draw categorical conclusions with respect to historical intent. Indeed, with
respect to a legislative process as complicated as that of the constitutional amendment process, it may be questioned whether the intent of an amendment in its application to a given
problem can ever be persuasively determined. In the end, courts cannot avoid the necessity
of arriving at their own conception of fundamental objectives sought to be achieved by an
amendment in terms of the words used, the historical circumstances that gave birth to the
amendment and the popular understanding of its purpose, and, in turn, fitting these objectives into the context of the contemporary scene.

1150

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 52

Viewing the question in this light, the Court proceeded rapidly
to its conclusion. 48 ' Emphasizing that education is today perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments, that compulsory education laws demonstrate our recognition of the importance
of education to our democratic society, that it is the very foundation
of good citizenship and that in these days it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education, the Court concluded that such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be available to all on equal terms. Segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprives the children
of the minority group of equal educational opportunities even though
the physical fq.cilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal: In
stating this conclusion the Court reached the core of the segregation
problem. Why is racial segregation in the public schools in itself a
violation of the equal protection clause?
In answering this question the Court referred to its opinions in
the Sweatt and McLaurin cases49 and more particularly to those parts
of its opinions stressing the importance of the intangibles in comparing the educational advantages afforded by segregated schools.
These considerations, according to the Court, applied with added force
to children in grade and high schools. "To separate them from others
of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."
Reference was made to the following :finding by the feder~l district
court in the Kansas case:
"A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to
learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a
tendency to retard the educational and mental development of
4 8 In proceeding to the disposition of the problem before it, the Court did not discuss
the third question propounded by it when it ordered reargument of the cases, namely,
whether it was within the judicial power, in construing the Fourteenth Amendment, to
abolish segregation in public schools. See note 9 supra. The answer is, of course, implicit
in the Court's decision. It was assumed in the course of the debates on the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 that Congress had the power to abolish segregation in schools in the exercise
of its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See note 45 supra. But it must
be remembered that these debates preceded the decision in the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883), where it was held that the fifth section of the amendment gave
Congress only a corrective power and not a substantive power to legislate on civil rights.
The whole history of interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment has proceeded on the
assumption that the substantive meaning of the equal protection and due process clauses
is a matter for judicial interpretation.
49 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 848 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637, 70 S.Ct. 851 (1950).
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Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they
would receive in a racially integrated school system."
The Court stated that whatever might have been the extent of "psychological knowledge" at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding
as to the retarding educational effect of enforced segregation was amply
supported by modem authority,50 and that any language in the Plessy
case contrary to this finding should be rejected.
The Court concluded, therefore, that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place." The gist of
the Court's holding is stated in a single sentence of simple but dramatic force: "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
In the companion case dealing with segregation in the public
schools of the District of Columbia,5 1 the Court reached the same
result but via a different route. The Fourteenth Amendment is not
applicable to the District of Columbia. But the District as a subdivision of the federal government is subject to the limitations imposed
by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court referred to prior decisions which indicated that the due process clause
prohibited classification that constituted an unreasonable discrimination. 52 It also stated that the liberty secured by due process could
not be restricted except for a proper governmental objective. Since
segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper
governmental objective, it imposes on Negro children a burden that
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the
due process- clause.
This, then, is the result. Legislation requiring or permitting local
school authorities to require racial segregation in public schools is inherently discriminatory and therefore invalid.
To be sure, the decision in Brown v. Board of Education applies
only to segregation in state supported schools. Moreover, the decision
does not mean that the states are required to establish school districts
in such a way as to insure racial integration. The Fourteenth Amendment does not require states to take steps to force the two races together. Segregation as a social pattern will continue and it will be
reflected in the public school system. In some areas a normal program of districting for school purposes will have the effect of a segre50 The "modem authority" cited by the Court consisted of studies made by psychologists and socit>logists. See footnote 11 to the Court's opinion.
51 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693 (1954).
52 On this question, see Antieau, "Equal Protection Outside the Clause," 40 CALIF.
L. REv. 362 (1952).

1152

MicmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 52

gation program. Nothing in the Court's opinion can be int~rpreted
to interfere with the normal districting of school areas on the basis
of geographical lines. The practical application of the Coures ruling
will entail substantial administrative problems. The Court recognized
this when it wisely decided to hear further arguments on the relief
and the remedies to be prescribed in carrying out the Court's decision. 53
The cases before the Court dealt only with public education at
the elementary and high school levels. The Court's statement that
the separate-but-equal doctrine has no place in the field of public
education does not necessarily mean repudiation of the Plessy doctrine
in respect to public education at the college and university level. To
"be sure, some of the language used in the opinion is broad enough to
encompass all state:-supported education. But the Court's reference
to compulsory education laws and the psychological effect of compulsory segregation on a child's motivation to learn indicates that the
holding and opinion of the Court were particularly directed to segregation in the public schools as this term is generally understood. 54
53 The Court's recognition of the administrative problems involved in giving effect to
a decision outlawing segregation in public schools was evidenced by the fourth question
propounded by the Court when it ordered reargument in these cases. See note 9 supra.
These questions were discussed at length in the Supplemental Brief for the United States
on Reargument, submitted by the Attorney General of the United States as amicus curiae,
at pp. 152-187. For further discussion of the administrative and enforcement problems, see
Leflar and Davis, "Segregation in the Public Schools-1953," 67 HARV. L. REv. 377 (1954).
54 Final decision on this question must await further clarification from the Court. On
May 24th, a week after the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court by per
curiam decisions vacated the judgments of two lower courts in cases dealing with segregation at the college level and remanded the cases with instructions to the courts below to
reexamine these cases in the light of the Court's opinion in the Brown case. State ex rel.
Hawkins v. Board of Control, 347 U.S. 971, 74 S.Ct. 783 (1954); Tureaud v. Board of
Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 347 U.S. 971, 74 S.Ct. 784 (1954). In
the Hawkins case the Supreme Court of Florida had dismissed a Negro's petition for a
mandamus order directing his admission to the College of Law at the University of Florida
on the ground that he had not offered evidence on the issue whether the law school facilities for Negroes at the Florida Agricultural and Mechanical College afforded him opportunities and facilities equal to those found at the University of Florida, 60 S. (2d) 162 (1952).
In the Tureaud case the court of appeals had held that the federal district court had erred
in issuing an injunction reqniring the admission of Negroes to the combined six-year arts,
science and law course at Louisiana State University since a three-judge court should have
been convened. (5th Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 807. The Court's disposition of these cases
may be interpreted to mean that the decision in the Brown case applies to all levels of
public education.
The Court at the same time denied certiorari review of the decision by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Wichita Falls Junior College Dist. v. Battle, (5th Cir. 1953)
204 F. (2d) 632, requiring a junior college maintained by the State of Texas to admit
Negroes living within its geographical jurisdiction even though the state provided separate
and adequate facilities for Negro students but at a greater expense to the petitioners in
time and money because of the greater distance involved. Wichita Falls Junior College
District v. Battle, 347 U.S. 974, 74 S.Ct. 783 (1954). The decision in this case could
rest adequately on the authority of the Supreme Court's decisions in the Gaines, Sweatt
and McLaurin cases.
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Discussion of this point becomes somewhat academic, however, since
the Court already in the Sweatt and McLaurin cases had undermined
segregation practices at the higher education level by its insistence in
the Sweatt case on a high standard of equality and by its emphasis in
the McLaurin case that the equal opportunity for the Negro to learn
meant equal opportunity to share in all phases of the educational process. Quite apart from these considerations, it may be supposed that
as a practical matter the program of racial segregation at the state university level will not long survive the collapse of segregation at the
public school level.
What are the implications of Brown v. Board of Education respecting the Plessy doctrine in its application to areas outside the
sphere of public education? Does the Court's opinion still leave room
for application of the separate-but-equal idea in the interpretation of
the equal protection clause? The language used by the Court warrants
an affirmative answer to this query. At least it is clear that the Court
did not commit itself on the continued vitality of the Plessy ·doctrine
in other areas. 'We conclude that in the field of public education
the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place." The Court's opinion
is concerned entirely with the effect of segregation policies in the vital
area of public education. Thus the Court has in effect bracketed
enjoyment of public school facilities along with enjoyment of the
use and possession of real estate as areas of right and privilege where
the state will not be permitted to enforce segregation policies. 55 In
both categories of cases it is possible to interpret the results to mean
either that these are areas where it is unreasonable to apply the Plessy
doctrine since there are no adequate considerations of public policy
to support the color classification or that the nature of the privilege
enjoyed is such as to make equality in treatment impossible within the
framework of the segregation pattern. Actually, these two interpretations blend into a single idea. A state-sanctioned policy of racial
segregation that places the minority race at a disadvantage is an unreasonable exercise of power that derives no support from the Plessy
case.
The care exercised by the Court in indicating that the separate55 On May 24th the Supreme Court denied certiorari review of the decision by the
California District Court of Appeals for the First District, holding that the San Francisco
Housing Authority's policy of providing segregated housing accommodations, pursuant to
the "neighborhood pattern policy" which took proportionate needs into account, violated
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Housing Authority v. Banks,
347 U.S. 974, 74 S.Ct. 784 (1954). This decision is in line with the Supreme Court's
prior decisions in Buchanan v. Warley and Shelley v. Kraemer.
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but-equal doctrine was no longer relevant in the sphere of public education does indicate that Plessy v. Ferguson may continue to command
some authority. Legislation requiring segregation of passengers by
common carriers may continue to be sanctioned, subject, however, to
the limitations imposed by the commerce clause and the Interstate
Commerce Act as pointed out in the earlier discussion. Likewise,
legislation requiring racial segregation with respect to the enjoyment
of public parks, swimming pools and golf courses is not directly affected
by the holding in Brown v. Board of Education, but the facilities made
available to the two races on a segregated basis must in fact be equal.5 6
What features distinguish the use of common carrier facilities and
the enjoyment of public recreational and sports facilities, on the one
hand, and enjoyment of public education, on the other, to warrant
a distinction in regard to the applicability of the separate-but-equal
idea? Several may be suggested. The Court's opinion in Brown -v.
Board of Education placed emphasis upon the intangible factors that
make the Plessy doctrine inapplicable to public schools. Education is
an experience and not simply an enjoyment of physical facilities. But
with respect to common carrier and public recreational facilities, the
emphasis is upon the enjoyment of the physical facilities and services
so that it is more nearly possible to speak of equality of enjoyment
within the pattern of segregation. Moreover, the Court's emphasis
56 In Beal v. Holcombe, (5th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 384, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the City of Houston denied equal protection to Negroes when
it established separate parks for Negroes and whites but made provision for municipal golf
courses only in parks reserved for whites. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on May
24th. 347 U.S. 974, 74 S.Ct. 783 (1954).
The Supreme Court at the same time vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., (6th Cir. 1953) 202 F.
(2d) 275, holding that there was no violation of the equal protection clause in the case
where a private association which had leased an amphitheatre in a municipal park refused
to admit Negroes to operatic performances conducted under its auspices. The Supreme
Court remanded the case with directions to re-examine in the light of its decision in Brown
v. Board of Education. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U.S. 971, 74 S.Ct.
783 (1954). Interpretation of the Court's action in remanding the case presents difficulties.
Since the amphitheatre was leased from the city, it is arguable that the city was a party
to the private association's action in denying admission to Negroes, and that the Supreme
Court's action impliedly rejects the holding below that there was no "state action."
Assuming that there was "state action," it seems quite clear that this action resulted
in discrimination against Negroes even within the limits of the separate-but-equal doctrine, since there was no indication that similar opportunities were available to Negroes
on a segregated basis. But the Court's direction to the lower court to reconsider the case in
the light of the decision in Brown v. Board of Education may imply that the Court is ready
to strike down racial segregation in the enjoyment of recreational facilities. This action by
the Court underscores the Court's readiness at this stage to reconsider the Plessy doctrine
in all phases of its application and gives support to the author's conclusion expressed at a
later point in the text that the complete demolition of the separate-but-equal concept may
be expected in due course.
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in the Brown case on the very important place that public schools and
compulsory education laws have assumed in American life suggests
a further basis for distinction. It may also be argued that legislation
designed to prevent close contact between adults of the two races in
passenger cars and in recreational facilities such as swimming pools
can be more plausibly rationalized as an exercise of the police power
to preserve the public peace.

Brown 11. Board of Education cannot, therefore, be regarded as a
final and decisive repudiation of Plessy 11. Ferguson and its separatebut-equal interpretation of the equal protection clause. Yet it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Court in the Brown case, even
though it carefully limited its opinion to the problem of racial segregation in public schools, dealt the Plessy doctrine a more decisive blow
than appears on the surface. 57 Insistence by the Court on re-appraisal
of the separate-but-equal idea in the light of contemporary conditions
is highly significant. Complex sociological, economic and cultural
developments, all serving to give a new perspective to the problem
of interracial relationships, make it unrealistic to appraise the legal
significance of present day segregation policies in terms of attitudes
and social factors that emerged during the post Civil War period.
Even more important is the recognition by the Court in Brown 11.
Board of Education that the Negro has reason to look upon segregation
legislation as a discriminatory measure designed to place upon him
the stamp of an inferior race. Here we get to the heart of the matter.
At this point the Court's recent opinion carries some echo of Justice
Harlan's thumping dissent in the Plessy case. Justice Harlan said
that a sense of candor required recognition that segregation legislation
imposed upon the Negro a badge of servitude and that the notion of
equal enjoyment of rights by the two races within the segregation
pattern was a thin rationalization designed to conceal this discriminatory purpose. The majority in the Plessy case rejected this argument.
Justice Brown who wrote the majority opinion in the Plessy case said
that if the segregation legislation was regarded as stamping the colored
race with a badge of inferiority, this was not by reason of anything
in the act but solely because the colored race chose to put that construction upon it. Yet in Brown 11. Board of Education Chief Justice
Warren stresses the retarding effect on the education of Negro children resulting from the sense of inferiority created by the segregation
legislation. While the Court does not go all the way with Justice
57 See

the second paragraph of note 56 supra.
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Harlan who in unequivocal language said that the white race intended
to fasten a second-class status upon the Negro by means of segregation legislation, it does place reliance upon the minority race's interpretation of such legislation as an expression of the white man's claim
to racial superiority. What the Court regarded as irrelevant in Plessy
v. Ferguson is now regarded as highly relevant. It is understandable
then that the Court in Brown v. Board of Education found it necessary to reject some of the language used in the Plessy opinion. In
defense of the Court which decided the Plessy case, it is suggested in
the recent opinion that the Court in that earlier day did not have the
benefit of modern psychological knowledge. It may be questioned,
however, whether modern authority in the field of educational psychology has improved upon Justice Harlan's understanding and statement of the problem in his classic dissent.
Once it is recognized by the courts that segregation legislation
embodies a philosophy premised on inequality of the two races, the
complete repudiation of Plessy v. Ferguson must necessarily follow in
the course of time. Only the force of precedent can save this case
from being completely overruled.

Plessy v. Ferguson did not squarely come to grips with the validity
of segregation legislation. It premised its decision on the grounds
that such legislation was a reasonable exercise of the police power
which did not really impair the right to equal protection since it permitted equal enjoyment of right by both races. But if such legislation
is premised on an assumption of superiority of the dominant race,
the legislation cannot be justified as a police measure. Moreover,
such legislation does not secure equality in the enjoyment of right.
The specious concept of separate-but-equal begs the basic issue whether
a state on the basis of race alone can deny to a Negro a liberty of
action accorded to white persons.58 If, as the Court has recognized
in recent cases,59 the right to equal protection is a personal right, it
is no answer to the Negro's clai:i;n to equal enjoyment of right that
white persons are similarly circumscribed in their freedom of action
as a result of segregation legislation. Inequality is not cured by a
compounding of inequalities. Due regard for the central historical
58 For an extended analysis of the classification principle represented by the separatebut-equal idea, see Ransmeier, ''The Fourteenth ,Amendment and the 'Separate but Equal'
Doctrine," 50 MicH. L. REv. 203 at 244 et seq. (1951).
59 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629, 70 S.Ct. 848 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education,
339 U.S. 637, 70 S.Ct. 851 (1950).
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purpose underlying the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments compels the conclusion that any legislative classification based
on race or color must be regarded as inherently arbitrary in character.
It may be surmised that the majority of the Court that decided
Plessy 11. Ferguson were aware of the inherent defect of a doctrine
that permitted legislative classification on the basis of race. It is
doubtful if they were so lacking in psychological knowledge as to be
blind to the assumptions of racial inequalities underlying such legislation. The key to Plessy 11. Ferguson is found in the willingness of
the majority to place the race problem within the custody of the several
states. Plessy 11. Ferguson took its place along with other pivotal
decisions aimed at restoring equilibrium within the federal system
notwithstanding the broad nationalistic sweep of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 60 The separate-but-equal doctrine furnished a plausible
means of accommodating the equal protection clause to the claim of
the states that they be allowed to handle the race problem in their
own way and with due deference to community sentiment. There
was no doubt in Justice Harlan's mind that the result in the Plessy
case, with its deference to state legislative power, marked a frustration
of the underlying historical purpose that gave unity and meaning to
the post-War amendments. Much in history supports this view. In
any event there is no room for doubt on the issue today. Whether
color lines are to be drawn in legislation, whether race is to be a
factor in the enjoyment or rights and privileges, whether a minority
race can achieve full equality of right despite legally compelled segregation-.these are questions which in their range and impact transcend the boundary of local interest and compel recognition as national
problems. At a time in history when this nation holds itself out
before the tribunal of the nations as a champion of democracy, freedom and equality, in opposition to totalitarian ideologies, the question
whether the American Negro is to enjoy full equality of right in
accordance with the plain language of the Constitution and in conformity to the democratic faith the nation professes is not a question
that can be pushed aside in deference to a states' rights philosophy.

Brown 11. Board of Education marks a milestone in the decline of
Plessy 11. Ferguson. Justice Harlan, champion of the Negro's right
to share the privileges of first-class citizenship, has been vindicated.61
60 See 2 WARREN, THE SUPRI!l\m CotmT IN UNITED STATES HxsTORY, rev. ed., 608
(1932).
61 See the article by Watt and Orlikoff, ''The Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice
Harlan," 44 h.r.. L. REv. 13 (1949).
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"Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens." 62 These were the words used by• Justice Harlan in
an opinion unheeded by his generation. But they had a prophetic
force that could not be denied. History marched on his side, and
when the Court announced its opinion in Brown v. Board of Education,
the voice of John Harlan was heard again.
e2pJessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at ·559, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).

